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Water as agent for social change, 1900–1939: 
 Two case studies of developmental state approaches 







The advent of the Union of South Africa in 1910, and especially the creation of the 
Union’s Irrigation Department in 1912, signalled the beginning of large-scale state 
investment in water storage infrastructure and the start of South Africa’s first dam-
construction boom on a national scale. At the same time the Union government also 
began to tackle its increasing social problems such as white poverty by combining poor 
relief with irrigation and dam-building projects. The Hartebeespoort Dam and irrigation 
scheme near Pretoria was the first Union project of its kind. Apart from harnessing water 
for agricultural development, the aim of these state projects was twofold: to provide 
temporary relief employment for poor and destitute whites through job creation during 
the construction phases of dams and canals, as well as establishing white irrigation 
settlement schemes. This article examines aspects of the South African state’s irrigation 
and poor relief projects with a special focus on the Kamanassie irrigation scheme (1919–
1925) in the Western Cape and the Buchuberg irrigation scheme (1929–1934) on the 
Orange River in the Northern Cape. The successes and failures of these projects as 
examples of socio-economic upliftment are discussed briefly. 
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Die koms van die Unie van Suid-Afrika in 1910, en veral die skepping van ’n uniale 
Besproeiingsdepartement in 1912, het die begin van grootskaalse staatsinvestering in 
waterbewaringinfrastruktuur en die blomtydperk van die land se eerste 
damkonstruksieperiode op ’n nasionale skaal ingelui. Terselfdertyd het die Unie-
regering groterwordende sosiale probleme soos blanke armoede begin takel deur 
armoedeverligting en dambouprojekte te kombineer. Die Hartebeespoortdam- en 
besproeiingskema naby Pretoria was die eerste Unie-projek van sodanige aard. 
Afgesien van die benutting van water vir landbou-ontwikkeling was die doel van 
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sodanige staatsprojekte tweevoudig: om tydelike armoedeverligting aan armblankes 
deur werkverskaffing tydens die konstruksiefases van damme en kanale te bied en 
deur blanke besproeiingsnedersettings te vestig. Hierdie artikel ondersoek aspekte 
van die staat se besproeiings- en armoedeverligtingsprojekte met ’n spesifieke fokus 
op die Kamanassie-besproeiingskema (1919–1925) in die Wes-Kaap en die 
Boegoeberg-besproeiingskema (1929–1934) op die Oranje-rivier in die Noord-Kaap. 
Die suksesse en mislukkings van hierdie projekte as voorbeelde van sosio-
ekonomiese opheffing word ook kortliks bespreek. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Besproeiingvestigingskemas; armblankes; droogtes; Pakt-regering; 




South Africa, it can be said, is a country defined by water, or rather the lack of an 
abundant supply of water. Historically its interior landscape is marred by periods of 
severe drought, interspersed sometimes by violent and destructive floods. Despite 
being a water-scarce country, the national psyche is imbued with the notion of the 
availability of water and water security since historical times. South Africa has close 
to the lowest conversion of rainfall to usable runoff from rivers of all countries in the 
world. It has a surface area of 1.22 million km², of which about one-sixth has no 
significant surface runoff. Swatuk states correctly that water is at the heart of all 
human development,1 and Adams and Anderson assert that irrigation ranked high in 
the concerns of agriculturalists of the colonial period.2 
 
Emerging irrigation initiatives in the colonial state 
 
Freund argues that in order to initiate developments such as large-scale irrigation 
projects a purposive state is necessary, one that is relatively incorrupt with a strong 
cadre of dedicated bureaucrats and institutions or agencies such as irrigation 
departments. Over time, such institutions have thus been able to modify or moderate 
and also direct investment, and with it, development.3 The modern era of state-
directed irrigation legislation and projects was ushered in from the mid-1870s and 
coincided with the age of British imperialism in southern Africa. The Cape Colony 
paved the way for water legislation in South Africa. At the heart of water law 
development under British rule was a desire to extend the reach of the colonial state, 
to advance white settlement into the interior of South Africa and to turn the region’s 
resources to the development of the British Empire. Swatuk describes the motives 
behind colonial irrigation policy as, inter alia, to encourage agricultural settlement; 
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enhance (pro-British) political stability; increase food production and to build state 
revenues. It was servants and supporters of the British Empire who strongly 
promoted the notion in South Africa of establishing white settlement schemes that 
were linked to irrigation. Swatuk explains that according to the developmental state 
approach, the socio-political goals of water management led to the increasing 
interference of state-makers in irrigation schemes in what became a narrative of the 
colonial state undertaking a “hydraulic mission”.4 
 
Freund elaborates on this, stating that together, capitalists and top government 
officials formed an elite, probably moulded through social associations, common 
educational background and personal ties. The members of such an elite were embedded 
in a concrete set of social ties that bound the state to society and provided institutional 
channels for the continued negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies.5 In the 
case of colonial South Africa the enthusiasm for irrigation and improved water provision 
emanated from politicians and officials as well as farmers. As early as the 1880s the 
British mining magnate Cecil Rhodes envisioned the damming of the Harts River as an 
opportunity to increase both food supplies to the diamond fields of Kimberley and local 
employment, although his scheme never materialised.6 It was upon notions regarding 
irrigation such as those suggested by Rhodes, that Sir Alfred Milner, the British high 
commissioner for South Africa and governor of the Cape, Transvaal and Orange River 
colonies between 1897 and 1905, built his imperial vision in southern Africa. White 
agricultural and irrigation settlements formed an important part of this vision. Milner 
promoted the idea of “self-governing white communities” on the sub-continent of 
southern Africa under British rule. He also played a significant role in the run-up to the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); in the construction of a post-war new South African 
colonial state; and in drafting an imperial blueprint for the region as a whole. Together 
with his administrative coterie of young Oxford graduates, he laid the foundation of a 
new developmental state.7 
 
Hydrological experts such as Sir William Willcocks, who served in India and 
then in Egypt (where he played a major role in the construction of the Aswan Dam) 
were summoned by Milner in 1901 to serve on commissions to investigate the 
settlement of British immigrants and the idea of linking this to irrigation schemes; 
they were asked to recommend an overarching strategy. South African irrigation 
prospects were beginning to be considered in the context of recent spectacular 
achievements in the control of water in the Punjab, in Egypt and the American West.8 
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For Milner, such irrigation schemes could serve the further purpose of providing 
employment for indigent whites.9 
 
The duties of the Lands Settlement Commission, appointed under the 
chairmanship of H.O. Arnold-Forster, were to enquire, inter alia, whether suitable 
land for settlement was available in terms of being “well-watered”, or could 
alternatively be rendered suitable by means of irrigation.10 These initiatives were 
undertaken because irrigation promised high increases in the value of land and 
production. In the first decade of the twentieth century there was even concern that 
the country’s mineral wealth might run out, and that the Transvaal Colony would be 
thrown back on its agricultural resources. In this context, water conservation for 
agriculture was a national issue.11 The commissioners were quite confident that much 
of the land could be improved by irrigation.12 In his turn, Willcocks wrote a 
comprehensive report for Milner on dam building and irrigation possibilities in the 
Cape, Orange River and Transvaal colonies which echoed the sentiments of the Lands 
Settlement Report. He concluded by maintaining that the only possible means of 
development in South Africa lay in the storage of water and its utilisation by 
irrigation when it was needed. Therefore, storage reservoirs were a “necessary and 
indispensable adjunct to irrigation development”. He was convinced that the 
permanent development of agriculture in the country would depend entirely “on 
irrigation and irrigation alone” and that in large parts of the Cape and Orange River 
colonies no crops could be grown without irrigation. Willcocks advocated fuller state 
control of, and investment in, water resources.13 
 
Two prominent politicians of the time, both of whom later served in the Union 
parliament, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick and Sir Thomas Smartt, also helped to set policies 
for later irrigation developments, based on their own experiences, and shaped the 
debate about how the interdisciplinary problems of irrigation settlements might be 
best addressed by the different government departments involved. Both Smartt and 
Fitzpatrick ventured into private irrigation and land settlement schemes advanced as 
tributes to two of Cecil Rhodes’s passions – irrigation development and the 
settlement of Britons on the land. In 1895 Sir Thomas Smartt formed the Smartt 
Syndicate as an irrigation and settlement project in the semi-arid Karoo in the 
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hinterland of the Cape Colony, and in 1913 Sir Percy Fitzpatrick launched the Cape 
Sundays River Settlements Company in the Eastern Cape.14 Smartt, who became 
South Africa’s Minister of Agriculture from 1921 to 1924, and who according to Lavin 
was “the father of irrigation”, influenced the course of state policy directly as the 
author of the Cape Irrigation Act of 1906.15 
 
Milner’s constructionist policies in the period after the Anglo-Boer War, 
supported enthusiastically by other influential servants of the Empire, created an 
imperial mind-set and a strong connection with British immigration, land settlement 
and agricultural development and irrigation schemes for the future South African 
state. 
 
Using water as an agent for social change 
 
Therefore, with the commencement of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910, the 
state became a well-established agency, in terms of water infrastructure and 
irrigation, to initiate and advance developmental projects. Economic and agricultural 
development through state-aided irrigation schemes and storage dams had to be 
enhanced. In 1912 Francis Kanthack, the former director of irrigation in the Cape 
Colony, became the first director of the new national Department of Irrigation and the 
most influential official in his sphere. Previously, he had also worked in the Public 
Works Department in the Punjab on one of the most ambitious irrigation projects in 
the British Empire.  
 
Kanthack brought with him a conviction about the role of the state in terms of 
irrigation development. Hanthack was convinced that agriculture in South Africa 
would be impossible without water conservation. The new department was led in its 
activities by the Union Irrigation and Conservation of Water Act of 1912 and 
Kanthack was the main drafter of this Act. It confirmed government’s almost 
exclusive focus on water for agricultural use and also opened the door for the 
development of South Africa’s first large water storage projects. Thus the year 1912 
signalled the beginning of massive state investment in water storage infrastructure 
and the beginning of South Africa’s first dam-construction boom, or as Van Vuuren 
refers to it, “the first golden era of dam building” in the country.16 
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Citizenship in the Union was becoming increasingly racialized and advantaged 
towards those recognised as white. Therefore, a salient feature of development 
initiatives, one that demanded attention from successive Union governments almost 
until the Second World War, was increasing white indigence, particularly among 
Afrikaners, after the Anglo-Boer War. This became the white state’s political burden, 
an issue which demanded state solutions and initiatives such as the construction of 
water infrastructure and irrigation settlement schemes. The period of Union 
government was an opportunity for the creation of an infrastructural platform, 
therefore water, as a natural resource, coupled with agriculture, came to be seen by 
those in power as a form of poverty relief and as an agent for social change. Against 
the background of a segregationist South Africa, these state-driven relief measures 
were aimed at white indigents only.17 
 
The Botha government was acutely aware of public expectations that the state 
would provide solutions to the pressing problem of growing white indigence. In a 
public speech he gave at Heidelberg, Transvaal, in 1916, the then prime minister, 
General Louis Botha, admitted that his government was frequently accused of doing 
far too little to improve the fate of the poor whites. According to Botha the sum of 
£250 000 was spent on purchasing land for irrigation settlements.18 In March 1919, 
the Minister of the Interior, General J.C. Smuts, issued a memo to all heads of 
government departments, encouraging them to adopt, as far as possible, the all-white 
labour policy enunciated for irrigation. The hope was that by the provision of 
employment, fore example dam-building and irrigation development, the state would 
alleviate the plight of many poor whites.19 Developmental initiatives that gave rise to 
white irrigation settlement schemes went hand in hand with the notion of a “back to 
the land” policy espoused, inter alia, by influential members of the Dutch Reformed 
Church (DRC) and Afrikaner political leaders such as D.F. Malan. Until the 1930s this 
policy was regarded as part of the solution to the poor white problem and would also 
keep white people within the agricultural sector.20 According to Du Plessis, rural 
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resettlement was also a plan to curb the proletarianisation and urbanisation of all 
poor whites.21 A 1922 interim report of the Drought Investigation Commission 
recommended “that the State should take these people [poor whites] in hand and by 
some system place them back on the land”.22  
 
The Union government’s first major project which involved white labour and 
the settlement of poor whites on irrigated lands, was the construction of the 
Hartebeespoort Dam and irrigation scheme near Pretoria between 1916 and 1925. 
This scheme was an important marker of increased state intervention in terms of 
white indigence. Authors such as Du Plessis, Clynick and Middelmann suggest that in 
addition to easing the prevailing socio-economic conditions of white indigence the 
state also had ulterior political motives for the resettlement of poor whites on the 
Hartebeespoort Dam irrigation scheme. They maintain that the government’s waning 
popularity among the white working class, due largely to its quelling of the industrial 
unrest in 1913 and 1914, would be neutralised to some degree if the Hartebeespoort 
Dam irrigation scheme was seen as a solution to white poverty and a gesture of 
goodwill from the government. They emphasise, among other issues, that the 
economic failure of the scheme as a developmental state project was because socio-
political considerations to alleviate white poverty had overruled the economic 
viability of the project. On the other hand, resettlement schemes such as these also 
contributed to crystallise residential and spatial segregation policies in rural labour 
projects, specifically the exclusion of Africans and Coloureds from the rural 
agricultural economy.23 
 
In his book, The Rise of Conservation, Beinart dedicates a chapter to the initial, 
privately sponsored irrigation and dam development projects developed by early 
farmers in the Cape Colony at a time when the state maintained a laissez faire attitude 
towards hydro-development for agricultural capital,24 while Shillington has published 
an article on the unsuccessful nineteenth-century irrigation schemes in the Harts 
Valley before heavy capital investment and direct state intervention took place with 
the initiation of the Vaal-Harts irrigation settlement scheme in the 1930s.25 J.C. Kotzé, 
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on the other hand, discusses the successes of state intervention and white settlement 
on the Vaal-Harts irrigation scheme.26 Authors such as Keegan, Morrell, Lewis, Berger, 
Abedian and Standish touch briefly on irrigation and the poor white problem but do 
not offer detailed studies on irrigation schemes and their implementation as a tool for 
poverty alleviation.27 
  
This article concurs with the findings of the studies mentioned above, namely 
that the political motives of state intervention in the implementation of irrigation 
schemes inevitably had a negative impact on the socio-economic success of such 
schemes. Yet, despite certain shortcomings and failures, from the point of view of 
irrigation per se, the Hartebeespoort and Vaal-Harts schemes were indeed viable 
projects. However, not all white poverty relief irrigation settlement schemes 
developed in the period from 1900 to 1939 were necessarily sustainable. The article 
investigates the mixed success of two lesser-known state-sponsored irrigation 
settlement schemes to alleviate white indigence: the Kamanassie and Buchuberg Dam 
irrigation projects. It will be argued that due to severe socio-political pressures, these 
projects of state-intervention were conceived before proper investigation and 
planning was undertaken in terms of sustainability – which may perhaps have 
influenced the government’s decision to commission the projects. The narrative on 
irrigation that follows has been compiled from government reports, memoirs, 
reminiscences and the personal experiences of hydraulic engineers and pioneer 
irrigation settlers, as well as the relevant published literature. 
 
The Kamanassie Dam and irrigation project 
 
Financing irrigation projects in various places throughout the Union formed part of the 
state’s poverty alleviation project. In the case of the Kamanassie scheme, agricultural 
development and economic recovery were the motives behind this state-sponsored 
white irrigation resettlement project.28 The arid region of Oudtshoorn in the Little Karoo 
is characterised by river valleys with rich alluvial soils; tobacco, vegetables, fruit and 
wine have been produced here since the nineteenth century. However, the region is also 
known for intermitted rainfall patterns and long, recurring droughts. Ostriches are 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850–1930 (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1986), pp 311–335.  
26.  J.C. Kotzé, “Die Vaalhartsbesproeiingskema: ‘n Ekonomiese en Sosiaal-geografiese 
Studie”, MA dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 1961. 
27.  See, respectively, Keegan, Rural Transformations; R. Morrell (ed.), White but Poor: 
Essays on the History of Poor Whites in Southern Africa, 1880–1940 (Unisa Press, 
Pretoria, 1992); Lewis, “A Study of Some Aspects of the Poor White Problem”; Berger, 
“White Poverty”; Abedian and Standish, “Poor Whites and the Role of the State”, pp 
93–108. 
28.  UG, 29-17, Reports on Various Irrigation Projects, 31 March 1918, p 13; UG, 30–32, 
Report of the Unemployment Investigation Committee, 1932, pp 15–19; F.J. van Biljon, 
State Interference in the Economy of South Africa (P.S. King & Son, London, 1939), p 
115. 




particularly well-adapted to these arid conditions29 and according to Beinart, the key 
economic factor stimulating irrigation in the Cape Colony was the burgeoning trade in 
ostrich feathers. Ostrich numbers increased from 22 000 in 1875 to 726 000 in 1911.30 
Van Vuuren argues that the majority of the irrigation districts established in the period 
1912 to 1913 were based on the success of the ostrich feather industry.31 Farmers soon 
realised that the most efficient means of ostrich farming was to enclose the ostriches in 
paddocks and provide them with suitable fodder, primarily lucerne. Using lucerne as 
fodder in turn necessitated irrigation and gave a higher yield, but the “miracle crop for 
the Cape”, as Beinart refers to it, required a great deal of water. This was a major reason 
why Oudtshoorn, well-watered from streams running down from the Swartberg 
mountains, became the major centre of ostrich production. By 1911, at the height of the 
ostrich boom, Oudtshoorn comprised 20 561 ha or 8.5 per cent of the total irrigated land 
in the country. 32 
 
But economic disaster struck the “ostrich barons” of Oudtshoorn in 1914 when 
the ostrich feather industry collapsed. Their financial woes were exacerbated by the 
serious droughts of 1914–1916, 1919, 1924 and 1927. So severe was the 1914–16 
drought, that in the opinion of J.H. Schoeman, Oudtshoorn’s member of the legislative 
assembly (MLA), drought outstripped the collapse of the feather industry as the main 
cause of the widespread distress suffered by farmers in 1916. Even prior to the 
feather industry crash, there had been a large-scale switch of farming practices from 
wheat, tobacco and vine cultivation – all of which required a great deal of labour – to 
lucerne and ostrich farming, making scores of bywoners (poor white share croppers) 
redundant on these farms. Now with lucerne cultivation and ostrich farming 
becoming less profitable, their labour was no longer required. All this meant that a 
growing poor white class of former bywoners was emerging in the Oudtshoorn area 
comprising people who had lost their access to land.  
 
The outbreak of World War One brought economic depression and a fashion 
change in the northern hemisphere; luxury goods such as clothes trimmed with 
ostrich feathers were no longer fashionable. Other reasons for the collapse of the 
market for feathers included overproduction; inadequate marketing; an unwise focus 
by some farmers on ostriches as their sole agricultural product; and reckless 
speculation on farm land. By 1917 the market value of ostrich feathers was only 27 
per cent of that of 1913. Numerous bankrupt farmers began to join the ranks of pre-
war poor bywoners who had already been driven from the land of wealthier farmers. 
In Oudtshoorn the labour market shrunk and building operations stopped almost 
completely. The scourge of the Spanish Influenza of 1918 also contributed to the 
destitute condition of rural dwellers. By the end of the war the socio-economic 
position for many families in the magisterial district of Oudtshoorn was indeed dire 
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and calls for relief lent urgency to new approaches from the Irrigation Department. 
Flood irrigation had proved adequate for lucerne, but more complex systems, capable 
of irrigating a wider range of high-value crops, were now essential.33 
 
The construction of dams in this period was also seen as a solution to the 
problem of water shortages. It was the Irrigation Department’s aim to stabilise water 
provision in dry seasons and to use stored flood water supplies to bridge longer 
periods of drought. Equally important, construction work on dams and irrigation 
works provided quite a few job opportunities for unemployed whites. Many of these 
poor whites cherished the idea of eventually being able to farm on irrigated land.34 
The slump in the market for ostrich feathers caused a general recession in the 
prosperity of local farmers, and led to increased competition for water supplies in 
order to step up lucerne production in the face of falling incomes. Farmers who had 
pulled out their tobacco crops and orange orchards to make room for ostriches now 
had to return to their former crops.  
 
Work on the Kamanassie Dam at Oudtshoorn in the south-western Cape 
commenced under these trying conditions. E.T.L. Edmeades, owner of the farm 
Kamanassie, proposed an irrigation dam to be constructed on the Kamanassie River, a 
tributary of the Olifants River. Due to the collapse of the feather market and the 
resultant economic recession the government declared the region indigent. A 
deputation of Oudtshoorn residents and farmers requested the Minister of Lands, Sir 
Thomas Smartt, to declare an irrigation district, which was granted in 1917. F.T. 
Patterson was appointed resident engineer to carry out the work with a loan granted 
by parliament. According to Patterson, it was decided that the white contingent of the 
labour force “should be recruited, as far as possible, from Oudtshoorn District”.35 
 
Construction of the Kamanassie Dam only began in June 1919 because the 
First World War hampered the acquisition of the necessary machinery and building 
supplies and placed significant strain on the Irrigation Department’s financial 
resources. According to Burman, 1919 also brought the worst drought in 50 years to 
the district. Work on canals commenced in January 1920. The design called for a mass 
concrete gravity section dam with a crest height of 44 m above the deepest 
foundation and 35 m above the riverbed. The dam wall was 386 m long and the main 
spillway on the right flank was 91 m wide with a waste weir wall of 183 m. An 
emergency spillway was 91 m long and was to discharge into a channel 46 m wide. By 
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the end of November 1919 43 580 mᵌ of concrete had been placed in the dam and 
earthworks of 48 km had been completed. The dam brought more than 9 400 ha 
under irrigation. Despite the good start, the rate of construction was impeded 
severely by the curtailment of funds and the project was only completed towards the 
end of 1925. Excavation for the foundations was done entirely by hand. A steam 
excavator for the construction of the canals and furrows was ineffective, necessitating 
pick and shovel manual labour. All materials were transported by wagons and 
donkeys were hired from local farmers and bywoners. The construction of the dam 
and irrigation works thus provided relief to the indigent and unemployed in a period 
of economic hardship.36 
 
 
Canteen for white workers at the Kamanassie construction site (Source: O.J.P. 
Stander Private Collection) 
 
In line with the prevailing segregationist policies of the time, black and white 
workers were kept separate socially and good facilities were provided, particularly 
for white workers.37 A white labour camp was constructed on one side of the 
Kamanassie River and a black labour camp on the other side. Housing was provided 
for 30 single men and there were also dwellings for 30 families. The white labour 
camp featured a school with three classrooms, a school principal’s house, a combined 
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café, mess hall and recreation room and sports facilities, such as a tennis court, a 
nine-hole golf links and a rifle range. On the other hand, the black labour camp 
comprised 24 thatched round huts and black workers were fed from a kitchen in the 
compound. Black labourers were rarely allowed to bring their families with them to 
the construction site. Unskilled (black) labour was recruited from the Eastern Cape.  
 
At the height of construction there were 1 800 men working on the scheme, 
some 600 on the dam and about 1 200 on the canals, which feed an area of some 
12 000 ha and cover a total length of 112 km.38 The cost of the scheme of about 
£800 000 had to be carried by the irrigators themselves, but as a result of the feather 
industry collapse and the drought of 1927, which was deemed to be the most severe 
in 100 years, they were unable to keep up with payments. By 1932 the debt burden 
incurred amounted to almost £1 250 000 and was eventually written off by the 
government.39 
 
The influence of the Pact government and the Great Depression on irrigation 
development and poor relief: Prelude to the Buchuberg irrigation scheme 
 
In the mid-1920s and the late 1930s the political and economic landscape of South 
Africa was altered again and this affected state policies on irrigation development and 
poor relief projects. Abedian and Standish explain that from about 1920 there was an 
unprecedented increase in unemployment due to factors such as the closing down of 
a number of low-grade gold mines; an economic depression; the restriction of 
diamond mining; and the inability of returned soldiers from the First World War to 
find work.40 A DRC deputation on the indigent and unemployed to the then prime 
minister, General J.C. Smuts, was informed that the government was no longer 
prepared to establish poor white settlements. It transpired that the authorities 
doubted whether such settlements were indeed the answer to poor relief. The costs of 
resettlement were too high and many indigents were not seen as suitable candidates 
for settlement schemes.41 
 
However, in the 1924 general election the South African Party led by General 
Smuts was defeated by a coalition of General J.B.M. Hertzog’s National Party and Col. 
F.H.P. Creswell’s Labour Party, which formed the so-called Pact government. The change 
of government altered the policy towards white indigence, although there was a degree 
of continuity in white poverty alleviation policies between the Smuts and Hertzog 
governments. Instead of establishing new rural settlements to alleviate the poverty 
problem it was now expected of indigents to rehabilitate themselves, albeit with some 
government assistance. The introduction of the Pact government’s “civilised labour” 
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policy in 1924 marked the beginning of greater state intervention and an intensification 
of the drive to eradicate the poor white problem. “Civilised labour” offered preferential 
treatment to white workers; certain work was to be done only by people who measured 
up to the standards of being “civilised” as perceived from a white perspective. In practice 
this meant that in government departments and municipalities, preference was given to 
the employment of whites over blacks. The new government aimed at driving an efficient 
irrigation administration. Under Act No. 33 of 1926, a permanent Irrigation Commission 
was formed.42 Its establishment was to a great extent the work of A.D. Lewis, who 
succeeded Kanthack as director of Irrigation in 1921. Lewis believed that the full 
implementation of irrigation schemes in settlement areas would alleviate the anticipated 
unemployment. The permanent Irrigation Commission took control of a number of 
existing irrigation schemes and as a result of this policy, thousands of workers 
throughout South Africa found employment.43 
 
However, preferential treatment of white labour could not stave off the disastrous 
consequences of the collapse of the New York stock exchange in October 1929, which 
heralded the Great Depression of 1929–1934. In South Africa the depression was 
preceded by a drop in the prices of agricultural products in 1925–1926 because of 
surpluses; a foot-and-mouth epidemic; the closing of some diamond mines leading to job 
losses; and another crippling drought in the years 1925 to 1928. Prices were so poor in 
these years that many farmers, even those who were progressive, were ruined. To make 
matters worse, a drought of considerable proportions took hold in large parts of South 
Africa during the last phase of the depression, leading to increased unemployment and 
exacerbating the poor white problem. From 1906 to 1932 the number of poor whites 
increased from 10 000 to 300 000.44  
 
It was the Great Depression with all its increased hardships which saw the 
introduction of effective steps to absorb much of the poverty by means of state 
employment. By 1934 government would change its emphasis from providing mostly 
temporary piece-work employment, to the creation of jobs that were also of a more 
permanent nature, such as irrigation works. By the 1930s, therefore, irrigation works 
provided notable employment opportunities for unskilled labourers. Workers 
recruited by the Department of Labour for this work were required to pass a medical 
test of fitness prior to engagement.45 In this period of acute crisis the development of 
a large-scale irrigation network was, for Hertzog’s National Party government, with 
its strong rural Afrikaner support base, a means of keeping whites productive in the 
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rural areas who would probably otherwise have drifted to the towns and aggravated 
the already chronic unemployment problem in the urban areas as well.46 Dam 
construction in the early 1930s can therefore also be regarded as “depression 
dams”47 of which the Buchuberg dam serves as poignant example. 
 
The Great Depression and the Buchuberg Dam and canal works: An example of 
emergency poor relief 
 
According to Billington and Jackson, putting people to work became a goal unto itself 
in America’s dam-building history. At times, construction on the so-called New Deal 
dam projects actually began even before engineers had completed detailed planning 
and design.48 Critical social and environmental conditions in South Africa 
necessitated similar initiatives. The outbreak of the Great Depression and the 
desperate drought-ridden conditions in the North-west Cape expedited the 
Buchuberg project in the lower reaches of the Orange River. In March 1929 the 
government decided to initiate this project as a drought and poor relief scheme. The 
Buchuberg Dam is situated in the Northern Cape, not far from Groblershoop, a small 
town named after J.C.H. Grobler, the minister of Lands in the Pact cabinet, who 
launched various initiatives such as agricultural settlements to relieve the increasing 
problem of white unemployment.49 A.D. Lewis, the director of Irrigation, was told to 
“start construction as soon as possible to provide employment for white people who 
were suffering from the effects of drought”. The urgency of the Buchuberg initiative 
as a poor relief project is illustrated by the fact that the engineers and workers 
arrived on site even before there was any specific scheme in mind, and it was only 
once preliminary work had begun that a decision was made to build a storage dam. 
The design for the dam and irrigation scheme was finalised only in 1930.50 
 
Funds for the project were provided by the Department of Labour which was 
also responsible for employing labour, while the construction was led by the 
Department of Irrigation. The Buchuberg Dam and canal were tackled as two separate 
construction projects. Resident engineer D.F. Kokot oversaw works at the dam, and A. 
Aslackson was the resident engineer in charge of work on the canal. Work on the dam 
and on the construction camp was “hurriedly commenced” concurrently in May 1929. 
Only white men were employed on the project, as was the case with many 
government infrastructure projects at the time. People came from far and wide 
seeking relief from unemployment. Many were farmers who had been forced to 
abandon their farms; some were former prospectors from the diamond diggings in 
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Lichtenburg and Alexander Bay and others came from cities as far afield as 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Bloemfontein to earn a meagre 7s 6d a day. Some were so 
desperate that they were prepared to work for food alone. Others arrived on site 
towards the end of 1928, months ahead of time, in the vain hope of finding 
employment the next year when the project was due to begin. The terrain was harsh 
and described as a “wasteland” and the work was physically exhausting and 
backbreaking. Level areas had to be chiselled from the mountain to create space for 
the stone crusher. All the work was done by hand, with pick, shovel and wheelbarrow, 
and with the assistance of donkeys and mules. Even the holes for the explosives were 
drilled by hand. The coffer dams were built on sand-bags which the workers carried 
back and forth on their backs. Temperatures by day often reached 40˚C and work 















Although some sources concur that an average of 350 men worked on the 
construction of the dam,51 the 1932 annual report compiled by the director of Irrigation 
states that some were unable to keep up with non-stop hard physical labour. Only rarely 
did more than 250 workers report daily for work on site.52 In fact, Van Zyl claims that 
quite a number of workers gave up and deserted to the nearest railway station.53 In this 
regard Kokot, the chief engineer, made some interesting social observations. According 
to him, white labourers responded better to the incentive of increased earnings by means 
of piece-work. He was also of the opinion that the situation could have been improved 
had it been possible to “freely discharge unsuitable men”. Workers were engaged by the 
Department of Labour and although they were subjected to a medical examination 
before being taken on, many were unable to cope with the extremely hard work. Because 
the work was primarily for the relief of unemployment, only those who were utterly unfit 
were discharged. This meant that a fair number of “passengers” were carried. Had 
sentiment not entered into the question “weaklings and malingerers would gradually 
have been worked out”, with the result that the general efficiency would have been 
raised considerably.54 
 
At the height of construction, there were over 3 000 people living on site. 
Everything, from labourers to equipment, was initially transported piece by piece using 
donkey carts, from the nearest train station more than 60 km away. Private individuals 
could also receive an income by transporting cement, iron and equipment on their 
wagons. Initially, children as young as nine worked for a sixpence hauling stone in an 
effort to help their families put food on the table. At one time there were apparently as 
many as 30 children between the ages of nine and fourteen working on the dam site. 
However, by June 1930 a school was opened. The camp later boasted a hospital with a 
medical officer who was paid by the Department of Labour. All the buildings, living units 
and facilities which appeared in due course, such as the resident engineer’s dwelling, 
single quarters for unmarried teachers and technical assistants, housing for the school 
principal and water supply works, were provided by the Department of Irrigation.55 
These observations concur with those expressed in research carried out by Tempelhoff 
and the reports issued by the director of Irrigation that when state assistance to 
indigents and the unemployed improved over time, the physical and material conditions 
of construction workers improved as well.56 
 
                                                          
51.  D.F. Kokot, “Buchuberg Dam”, Civil Engineering, 30 January 1932, pp 168–170, 176–
177; Mackenzie, “Irrigation in South Africa”, p 10; Anon., “Buchuberg: Built on the 
Backs of Men”, pp 27–28; Van Vuuren, In the Footsteps of Giants, p 115; Van Zyl, 
Boegoeberg se Mense, pp 17, 19, 23, 27, 38, 46–47, 61; Venter, Water, p 319. 
52.  UG, 10–1932, Report of the Director of Irrigation, 1 April 1930 to 31 March 1931 
(Government Printer, Pretoria, 1937), p 19. 
53.  Van Zyl, Boegoeberg se Mense, p 27. 
54.  Kokot, “Buchuberg Dam”, pp 175–176. 
55.  Anon., “Buchuberg: Built on the Backs of Men”, p 28; Van Vuuren, In the Footsteps of 
Giants, pp 115–116; Van Zyl, Boegoeberg se Mense, pp 18–19, 23–24, 38, 44–45, 47, 
53, 61; Kokot, “Buchuberg Dam”, pp 173, 176–177; Venter, Water, p 319. 
56.  UG, 3–1938, Report of the Director of Irrigation, 1 April 1936 to 31 March 1937, p 31; 
Tempelhoff, “Omgewingslagoffers of Armblankes?”, pp 22–23. 




By 1932 construction of the dam had advanced enough for water to flow into 
the canal for the first time. The 121 km canal was completed in 1934. Initially it was 
an earthen canal which led to siltation from time to time and had to be cleansed 
manually. In 1952 the canal was lengthened to 172 km and its walls lined with 
cement. It had an irrigation capacity of 3 400 ha. The dam wall, built in the nature of a 
barrage or weir, was constructed to a final height of 10.7 m and is 622 m long. The 
dam had an initial storage capacity of 40 million mᵌ and was originally equipped with 
68 sluices designed to allow sediment to pass through the structure.57 The whole 
scheme was handed over to the Lands Department for operation and maintenance in 
1934 and in 1945 the Irrigation Department resumed control of the canal.58 
 
Apart from providing temporary employment in the construction phase of the 
project, it was also the state’s intention to provide some permanent measure of relief 
by settling poor whites on irrigation land. Farmers with draught animals working on 
the construction had the first choice to apply for “proof hire” of land. Individual 
irrigation plots ranged between 4.9 and 6.8 ha and initially there were 943 plot 
holders under the Buchuberg irrigation scheme. Once a settler’s application for land 
was approved he could work the plot for two years to prove that he could farm 
effectively. Originally all land belonged to the state and had to be leased. It was only in 
the late 1940s that irrigators obtained the right to purchase land from the 
government. Plots were sold for about £600 to be redeemed over 60 years at a rate of 
one per cent interest per year. In the early years many irrigators suffered poverty 
because of the small economic units demarcated and they also lacked agricultural 
experience and skills. In the formative years of the settlement irrigators suffered low 
prices because there was no market for their agricultural products. But after the 





The Kamanassie and Buchuberg projects provide a clear illustration of the nexus 
between state-sponsored white settlement irrigation schemes and white poverty 
alleviation. Dam-building and irrigation settlement projects were important in 
addressing the looming white unemployment and indigence problem in an effort to 
change a social environment in degradation. Opportunities were created for white 
South Africans to ensure their existence in a rural environment, and the National 
Party government under General J.B.M. Hertzog adhered to the demands of its 
Afrikaner constituency to alleviate the plight of the poor through state employment.60  
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Despite limited resources the South African state was able to utilise water as 
an agent for social change and create infrastructure for water conservation, 
agricultural development and food security as well as address the pressing need for 
poor relief. The promotion of the farming industry and welfare creation drew on 
irrigation as the main focus of water legislation until the Water Act, No. 54 of 1956, 
was promulgated and the state’s water conservation and infrastructure strategy 
shifted towards supporting South Africa’s industrial and economic development.61 
But white irrigation settlements such as Hartebeespoort, Kamanassie, and Buchuberg 
illustrate that the state did not intervene simply for altruistic reasons. Irrigation 
development also revealed the Union governments’ ulterior motive to manipulate 
irrigation settlement and poverty alleviation for political expediency. This 
corroborates Freund’s third argument that successful developmental states are able 
to achieve broad general, if passive, support from their populations because they can 
deliver the material goods and raise living standards.62 On the other hand, these pro-
white policies contributed to the crystallisation of rural residential and spatial 
segregation, because African and Coloured farmers were excluded from the rural 
agricultural economy and irrigation settlement schemes. 
 
Both the Kamanassie and Buchuberg irrigation schemes, as many others in 
South Africa’s irrigation history, were established to combat ecological stress (severe 
drought) and concomitant economic and social duress (depression and white 
indigence). However, despite concerted efforts, poor relief through irrigation 
schemes can at best be regarded as having mixed success and the state’s political 
expedience to appease an expectant poor white electorate sometimes led to rash 
irrigation planning. For instance, the Kamanassie irrigation scheme was only partially 
successful and its immediate benefits were overestimated. Although poverty relief 
was achieved through temporary labour opportunities for white indigents, on 
completion of the scheme it transpired that the land was unsuitable for permanent 
irrigation. The district’s average annual rainfall between 1914 and 1937 was only 
243.56 mm.63 Because of recurring droughts and an intermittent river flow, the 
surface runoff in the catchment area diminished. It appears that the project was 
doomed to fail. Only rarely was the dam filled to capacity which rendered irrigators 
vulnerable to economic disaster due to an unpredictable water supply for their crops. 
Primitive practices of flood irrigation and earthen furrows involved an excessive 
waste of water. Furthermore, many irrigators lacked the ability to repay their loans 
and therefore could not develop the irrigable land to its full potential.64  
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There was a similar outcome at the Buchuberg Dam project. Emergency 
poverty relief was provided in the form of jobs on the construction site and farming 
opportunities were available on the irrigation settlement scheme. But soon after the 
completion of the dam the sediment sluices were closed permanently when siltation 
halved its storage capacity.65 In 2002, a dam safety inspection report indicated that 
29 of the dam’s 68 gates had been sealed off to reduce operational problems.66  
 
Using the examples of the Kamanassie and Buchuberg projects it is clear that 
the developmental state approach of utilising water as a natural resource to alleviate 
a social problem such as white indigence was not always an outright success. Both 
schemes were initiated in response to substantial political and social pressure on the 
state to provide poverty relief. Climatological data research and analysis of the 
sustainability of these projects was not undertaken prior to the construction of the 
Kamanassie Dam, nor did engineers apply proper hydraulic design principles in 
planning the Buchuberg weir. Further, under the trying circumstances, no proper 
selection criteria were used to select workers who were suited for the physical 
demands of the job. 
 
The 1934 report of the Carnegie Commission to investigate the poor white 
issue pointed out that many aspirant settlers lacked irrigation experience. 
Furthermore, it recommended that only candidates who showed the necessary 
perseverance to overcome the trying conditions on pioneer projects, be selected as 
settlers.67 These recommendations concur with Kokot’s observations that not all poor 
white candidates recruited by the Department of Labour for irrigation relief projects 
such as the Buchuberg scheme were physically and mentally fit to meet the harsh and 
strenuous working conditions required. However, conditions improved for those 
settlers who persevered because the market for their agricultural products improved 
after the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, in his seminal study on 
hegemonic state planning and state-initiated social engineering to solve human 
problems, James C. Scott, a professor of political science and anthropology at Yale 
University, argues that radically simplified designs for social organisation seem to 
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